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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
FLOID C. HARTMAN and 
RUTH A. HARTM.AN, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
ORA ANll POTTER, P.USKY 
OIL COHPANY and CHEVRON 
OIL CONPANY, 
Case No. 
16004 
Defendants-Respondents. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about the 27th day of June, 1951, Defendant Potter's 
predecessors William M. Potter and Rose K. Potter, sold to the 
Plaintiffs certain real estate located in Duchesne County, Utah. 
The land consisted of one hundred sixty (160) acres. The Deed 
contained a reservation of oil, gas, and mineral rights as follows: 
"There is reserved unto the Grantors three-fourths (3/4) 
of all the oil, gas, and mineral rights to the above land 
belonging, 1-1ith the right of ingress and egress thereon 
for the purpose of finding and producing oil, gas, and 
minerals thereon. 
This deed is given subject to a prior lease of all the oil, 
gas, and mineral rights to said land belonging." 
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Plaintiffs believed that they received, as part of the 
conveyance, a one-fourth (1/4) interest of one hundred per cent 
(100h) interest of the oil, ~as, and mineral rip.hts on the land 
purchased by them. The original sellers are deceased and the 
Defendant, Ora Ann Potter, is the daughter-in-law of the original 
sellers. The Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs received no 
interest in the oil, gas, and mineral rights of the land purchased 
by the Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs initiated a~ action to quiet title to the oil, 
gas, and mineral rights and further r~quested an accounting and 
Judgment for such royalties to which Plaintiffs may have been 
entitled. 
DISPOSITIOll Hl LOVJER COURT 
By stipulation the Defendants moved for Summary Judgment 
requesting that the Court enter Judgment in Defendants' favor and 
Plaintiffs moved for Summary Judrment in Plaintiffs' favor quieting 
title to a maximum of twenty-five per cent (25%) of one hundred 
per cent (100%) and a minimum of twelve and one-half per cent 
(12-l/2%) of one hundred per cent (100%) of the oil, gas, and 
mineral rights of the land in question in the Plaintiffs and orderinr, 
an accounting and payment of royalties on the past production and 
future production of oil, gas, and mineral on the land in question. 
The Notions for Summary Judgment were heard on Friday, 
June 2, 1978, at 10:00 o'clock a.m. by the Honorable David K. Winder, 
District Judge. On the 3rd day of July, 1978, Judgment was entered 
in favor of the Defendants and against the Plaintiffs. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT on APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek a reversal of the Summary Judgment in 
favor of the Defendants and seek Judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs 
on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
STATEHEIJT OF FACTS 
On or about June 27, 1951, the Plaintiffs purchased from 
William M. Potter and Rose K. Potter, husband and wife, parents of 
Defendant Potter's husband, certain property located in Duchesne 
County, State of Utah, more particularly described as follows: 
The Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter; 
the Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter; 
the Southeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter; 
and the Northeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter, 
of Section 32, Township 1 South, Range 4 Hest, U.S.M., 
containinp, 160 acres, more or less. 
Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, the Sellers reserved unto 
themselves a part of the oil, gas, and mineral rights to the land 
purchased by the Plaintiffs using the following statement of 
reservation: 
"There is reserved unto the Grantors three-fourths (3/4) 
of all the oil, gas, and mineral rights to the above land 
belonging, with the right of ingress and egress thereon for 
the purpose of finding and producing c:l, gas, and minerals 
thereon. 
This deed is given subject to a prior lease of all the oil, 
gas, and mineral rights to said land belonging." 
Prior to the sale of the land in question to the Plaintiffs, 
the Sellers, William M. Potter and Rose K. Potter, his wife, conveyed 
fifty per cent (50~) of all of the oil, gas, and mineral rights to 
the aforesaid land to one C. R. Bennett of Tulsa, Oklahoma, which 
conveyance Has executed on July 29, 1946. 
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The Plaintiffs contend that the wording in the Deed of 
Conveyance between William M. Potter and Rose K. Potter, his wife, 
to the Plaintiffs, which reserved a three-fourth (3/4) interest to 
all of the oil, gas, and mineral rights on the one hundred sixty 
(160) acres in question, was intended to reserve the fifty per cent 
(50%) conveyed by the Potters to Mr. Bennett and an additional 
twenty-five per cent (25~) to be reserved for the benefit of 
William M. Potter and Rose K. Potter, his wife, or their heirs, 
and twenty-five per cent (25%) interest to all of the oil, gas, and 
mineral rights was intended to be conveyed to the Plaintiffs. Under 
this interpretation of the document, the entire one hundred per 
cent (100/,) of the oil, gas, and mineral rights would be logically 
accounted for. 
The Defendants agree that fifty per cent (50%) of the oil, 
gas, and mineral rights to the one hundred sixty (160) acres in 
question was conveyed to C. R. Bennett in 1946. The Defendants 
contend, however, that William M. Potter and Rose K. Potter, his 
wife, reserved an additional seventy-five per cent (75%) interest, 
notwithstanding the fifty per cent (50%) previously conveyed to 
C. R. Bennett and, therefore, the Plaintiffs received no mineral, 
oil, or gas interest to the property purchased by the Plaintiffs 
because the Potters reserved to themselves more than the total 
interest available. 
The Deed from William M. Potter and Rose K. Potter, his 
wife, to the Plaintiffs can also be interpreted a third \vay. That 
is that William M. Potter and Rose K. Potter, his wife, intended 
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to reserve to themselves seventy-five per cent (75%) of the remaining 
oil and gas interest after the fifty per cent (50%) was conveyed, 
thereby conveying to the Plaintiffs twenty-five per cent (25%) of 
fifty per cent (50%), or twelve and one-half per cent (12-l/2%) of 
one hundred per cent (100%) of the oil, gas, and mineral rights to 
the property. 
The lawsuit presently pending was brought to interpret, from 
the provisions in the Deed and actions and conduct of the parties, 
the intent of the parties as to the conveyance and reservation of 
oil, gas, and mineral rights on the property. 
The Deed in quesbion was prepared without the assistance 
of lawyers and prepared by a clerk at one of the local banks in 
Roosevelt, Utah. (R 214, Plaintiff's Deposition Page ll, Lines 22 
through 25.) 
ARGUI1ENT 
POINT l. 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRAUTING DEFENDANTS' 
SUMMARY JUDG!·1ENT M!D IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTIOll FOR SillJMARY JUDGNENT. 
In reviewing the wording of the Deed, there is little 
question that the reservation of oil, gas, and mineral rights is 
ambiguous, especially considering the fact that prior to the 
conveyance by the Defendant Potter's predecessors and the Plaintiffs, 
fifty per cent (50%) of one hundred per cent (100%) interest of the 
oil, gas, and mineral rights to the land in question had been conveyed 
to C. R. Bennett of Tulsa, Oklahoma. Since only fifty per cent (50%) 
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of one hundred per cent (100%) of the oil, gas, and mineral ri~hts 
to the land in question remained to Defendant Potter's predecessors, 
the reference to a reservation of three-fourths (3/4) of all oil, 
gas, and mineral rights to said land belonginr, can only be construed 
to mean that the Grantor intended to protect the fifty per cent 
(50%) previously conveyed plus an additional twenty-five per cent 
(25%) for themselves or their heirs thereby conveying a remaininp, 
twenty-five per cent (25%) to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs conducted 
themselves consistent with this belief as reflected in their 
subsequent conveyances of the same parcel of land to others 
(R, Page 6). Plaintiffs also entered into lease agreements with 
various companies believing that they owned a one-fourth (l/4) 
interest to the oil. gas, and mineral rights on one hundred sixty 
(160) acres of land in question (R. Page 5). Had the lower 
Court considered the conduct of the parties to the conveyance in 
arriving at its conclusion as to the intent of the parties, there 
would have been little question that the Plaintiffs fully believed 
that they \.Jere the owners of a twenty-five per cent (25%) interest 
to the oil, gas, and mineral rights on one hundred sixty (160) 
acres of land purchased by the~ from Defendant Potter's predecessors 
In Clotworthy v. Clyde (1954) 265 P. 2d 420, 1 Utah 2d 251, 
the Court stated: 
"\-.There an instrument or instruments of title leave ambiguity 
or uncertainty concerning intent, the Court may look to 
surrounding circumstances to determine it." 
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Also in Wood v. Ashby (1952) 253 P. 2d 351, 122 Utah 580, the 
Court stated: 
"vJhere prov~s~ons of a deed are doubtful in meaning, the 
Court must also look to practical construction placed upon 
the deed by the parties." 
Also sec;: 
Garcia v. Garcia (1974) 525 P. 2d 863, 86 HH 503. 
\·Jhite v. Brooks 512 P. 2d 1350, 266 OR 506. 
Furthermore, as a general rule, where ambiguity exists, 
the Courts have consistently held that such ambiguous language in 
mineral deeds should be construed against the grantor, especially 
where no attorneys or lm.;yers were involved in the soliciting or 
drafting of the agreement. In Patterson v. Wilcox, 11 Utah 2d 264, 
358 P. 2d 88, the Court stated: 
"He agree that generally speaking, language in instruments 
of grant is construable more strongly against the grantor." 
In an earlier case, the Utah Supreme Court, in Wood v. 
Ashby (1952) 253 P. 2d 351, 122 Utah 580, the Court held: 
"It is generally conceded that a deed is to be construed 
most strongly against grantor and most favorably to the 
grantee." 
In Hodgin v. State (1973) 513 P. 2d 304, 9 Hash App. 486, 
the Washington Court stated: 
"If a deed admits of more than one construction, it must 
be construed ~ost strictly against grantor and most favorable 
to grantee." 
In this case, three separate interpretations of the document 
are possible. 
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(1) The first is that the original grantors did not recall 
their prior conveyance to C. R. Bennett of fifty per cent (50%) of 
all the oil, gas, and mineral rights to the land in question and, 
therefore, intended to retain seventy-five per cent (75%) of all 
the oil, gas, and mineral rights to the one hundred sixty (160) 
acres in question to themselves and their heirs. 
(2) The second interpretation would be that the grantors 
understood and were aware of the fifty per cent (50%) previously 
conveyed and intended to retain seventy-five per cent (75%) of 
fifty per cent (50~) of the oil, gas, and mineral rights to the 
one hundred sixty (160) acres in question thereby conveying to 
the Plaintiffs twenty-five per cent (25%) of fifty per cent (50%) 
or twelve and one-half per cent (12-1/2%) of one hundred per cent 
(100%) of the oil, gas, and mineral rights to the one hundred 
sixty (160) acres in question. 
(3) The third interpretation, which is the most logical 
of the three possibilities, is that the original grantors, being 
fully a1vare of the fifty per cent (SOlo) previously conveyed intended 
to protect the fifty per cent (50%) previously conveyed and in 
addition intended to retain an additional twenty-five per cent 
(257) of one hundred per cent (100%) of the oil, gas, and mineral 
rights to one hundred sixty (160) acres to the Plaintiffs. Thus, 
the original grantors reserved seventy-five per cent (75%) or 
three-fourths (3/4) of one hundred per cent (1007) of the oil, gas, 
and mineral rights of the land conveyed to the Plaintiffs. 
• 
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The lower Court elected to enter Judgment on the first of 
the three possibilities holding that since the orieinal grantors 
reserved a greater percentape of oil, gas, and mineral rights than 
remained after t~e original fifty per cent (SO%) had heen conveyed 
to C. R Bennett, the original grantors had nothing left to convey 
to Plaintiffs and, therefore, Plaintiffs received no oil, gas, and 
mineral rights by the conveyance of one hundred sixty (160) acres 
of land. 
These circumstances are practically synonymous to contracts 
ivhich have more than one possible meaning, one of which would 
make the contract valid and the other which would rn.ake the contract 
invalid. It is clear that the Courts in most of the states have 
accepted the rule that where a contract can be construed to pro-
duce a valid conveyance while another one did not, the interpret-
ation preserving the legal effect of the document would be preferred. 
In Corbin on Contracts, Vol. 3, Chapter 24, Section 546, p. 169, 
the author states: 
''If therefore, the words of a contract have more than one 
possible meaning and one of these includes or would produce 
a legal effect that court believes the parties intended to 
produce, uhile another one Hould not, the court should 
unhesitatingly adopt the first meaning." 
In the circumstances before this Court, the trial court 
adopted an interpretation of a document which presumes that the 
original grantors from which Plaintiffs purchased the property 
attempted to retain for themselves a greater interest in the oil, 
gas, and mineral rights to the one hundred sixty (160) acres than 
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was possible at the time of conveyance, considerinr, the original 
fifty per cent (50%) which had previously been conveyed to C. R. 
Bennett. To do so is to assume that the original grantors were 
unaware of the prior conveyance to C. R. Bennett or had forgotten 
that the grant had been made. The interpretation most consistent 
with the facts surrounding the conveyance of one hundred sixty (160) 
acres is to assume that the original grantors were fully cognizant 
of the fifty per cent (50%) previously conveyed to C. R. Bennett, 
intended to reserve to themselves an additional twenty-five per 
cent (25%) of the oil, gas, and mineral rights and intended that 
Plaintiffs receive the remaining twenty-five per cent (25%) of the 
oil, gas, and mineral rights. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiffs submit that the trial court erred in granting 
a judgment against the Plaintiffs and in favor of the Defendants for 
the following reasons: 
1. The conduct of the Plaintiffs reflect that they believed 
they had a twenty-five per cent (25%) interest to the oil, gas, and 
mineral rights on the land purchased by them from Defendant Potter's 
predecessors and such belief is reflected in the documents of sale 
by the Plaintiffs to others and by the oil and gas lease entered 
into between Plaintiffs and various oil companies. 
2. The case law as to ambiguous deeds clearly favors the 
Plaintiffs' position in that ambiguous deeds are construed strongly 
against the grantor and in favor of the grantee. 
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3. Hhere more than one interpretation of the deed 
is possible, the deed should be construed in a manner which would 
make it valid and effective; and an interpretation should not be 
adopted which would make the terms of the deed more ambiguous or 
more conflicting. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KEFNETH M. HISATAKE 
1825 South Seventh East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84105 
Attorney for Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that the foregoing Appellants' Brief was 
served on counsel for the Respondents, Robert G. Pruitt, Jr., Pruitt 
& Gushee, 875 Beneficial Life Tower, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, and 
Clark R. Nielsen, Nielsen, Henriod, Gott fred son & Peck, 1+10 t7e\vhouse 
Buildin~, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, by mailing a copy thereof, 
/ postage prepaid, on the ~~ day of October, 1978. 
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